Råstofudvinding - Mining the Canadian Arctic

It appears that non-renewable resource development is a very poor solution for Inuit economic difficulties. It is recommended that this be regarded as but one minor alternative for a small proportion of the native population.

Tirsdag d. 28. oktober 1997
Jack Hicks
Emnekreds: Erhverv, Kultur og samfund, Politik, Råstoffer, Økonomi.

Indholdsfortegnelse:
Introductory Notes
The History of Mining in the Canadian Arctic
The Role of Mining in the Economy of the Northwest Territories
The Role of Mining in the Future Economy of Nunavut
Issue: Environmental Protection
Issue: Employment and Human Resource Development
Issue: Other Socio-Economic Benefits
Issue: Socio-Economic Impacts
Conclusions and Suggestions

discussion paper prepared September 1997 for the Minerals Office, Greenland Home Rule Government
Jack Hicks moved to the NWT in 1981, working in community development and community adult education first in the Western NWT and since 1985 in Nunavut. Formerly Executive Director of the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada and Director of Research for the Nunavut Implementation Commission. Currently in charge of strategic planning for Nunavut in the Government of North West Territories Department of Resources, Wildlife and Economic Development.

Table of Contents:
  • Introductory Notes
  • The History of Mining in the Canadian Arctic
  • The Role of Mining in the Economy of the Northwest Territories
    • Exploration
    • Operating Mines
  • The Role of Mining in the Future Economy of Nunavut
  • Issue: Environmental Protection
    • Recommendation # 35
  • Issue: Employment and Human Resource Development
  • Issue: Other Socio-Economic Benefits
  • Issue: Socio-Economic Impacts
  • Conclusions and Suggestions


Introductory Notes
The goals of this paper are to summarize the experiences of and Inuit responses to mining in Nunavut and the other regions of the Canadian Arctic, and - reflecting on those experiences and responses - to offer suggestions to the Greenland Government’s Minerals Office on issues which may warrant investigation in advance of possible large-scale non-renewable resource development.

The focus on mining results from the considerable amount of research has taken place - and has been published - on the socio-economic impacts of oil and gas development in the Beaufort Sea and Alaska’s North Slope.

Opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author, and should not be assumed to reflect those of any organization.

All dollar figures used in this report are in Canadian dollars.

The History of Mining in the Canadian Arctic
Northern Canada is endowed with abundant non-renewable natural resources, and exploration and development of those resources have increased steadily since World War II. Particularly during the past 20 years new regulatory controls have been emplaced in response to elevated concerns about the possible impact of resource development on the environment. During the past 40 years gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, nickel, asbestos, tungsten, uranium, coal and other minor commodities have been produced from more than 30 mines in the northern mainland, but at the present time only 6 mines are producing gold, silver, lead and zinc in that area: Con, Giant Yellowknife, Echo Bay, Mount Skukum, United Keno Hill and Faro mines. Lead and zinc are being produced at the world’s most northerly mine, Polaris, on Little Cornwallis Island, and lead, zinc and silver are mined at Nanisivik on Baffin Island. At least 375 oil and gas wells have been drilled north of the Arctic Circle in the northern mainland since 1947, and 42 oil and gas fields have been discovered in the Beaufort Sea-Mackenzie Delta area alone. Total discovered and undiscovered resources in the latter area approximate 2,131 billion [cubic meters] gas and 1.35 billion [cubic meters] oil. From 1961 to 1986, 176 wells were drilled in the Arctic Islands and 17 oil and gas fields were discovered. Discovered and undiscovered resources approximate 2,257 billion [cubic meters] gas and 686 million [cubic meters] oil.(1)

Missing from those cold dates and production statistics is a fascinating human story: Inuit and prospectors/miners have mingled literally since Europeans first arrived in northern Canada, but it is only in the past few years that anything approaching a partnership acceptable to the Inuit has been worked out.

Inuit collected, traded and used native copper, pyrite, galena, chert, quartz and various kinds of soapstone, carving stone or pipestone long before contact with Europeans. Deposits of soapstone and copper were well know historically to - and used by - the Inuit.

Canada’s Arctic would be rather different today had the small mountain of rock which Martin Frobisher’s men mined between 1576 and 1578 from what is still known today as Frobisher Bay contained gold rather than ‘fool’s gold. Instead, it took Europe’s industrial revolution, 300 years later, to create such a demand for minerals such as coal, graphite and mica that significant exploration again occurred in the area we know today as the Northwest Territories (NWT).

Whalers and Hudson’s Bay Company traders sporadically mined mica and graphite at several locations on south Baffin Island from the middle of the last century until the 1930s. Expeditions on Ellesmere Island in the High Arctic discovered and mined soft coal for their local use in the 1870s and 1880s, and also during the 1870s a mica and graphite mine in Cumberland Sound exported almost 15 tonnes of those minerals to the United States. Small coal deposits were also mined on north Baffin Island and in the Western Arctic from sources close to the modern communities of Aklavik and Paulatuk. Gold remained the preferred find, but it was not until 1928 that prospectors took out 2.7 kg of gold from a small showing on the west coast of Hudson Bay.

During the past 40 years exploration has taken place throughout the Canadian Arctic as the search for various minerals ebbed and waned. In the 1950s and again in the 1970s uranium was in high demand, and a number of discoveries were made in Labrador and in the Baker Lake area west of Hudson Bay. In the late 1960s there was a staking rush in the Coppermine (now known as Kugluktuk) area as the copper deposits sought by Samuel Hearne in 1771 (which resulted in the ‘Bloody Falls massacre’ of resident Inuit by his Dene guides) again became of interest. The iron deposits of Baffin Island and the Melville Peninsula were examined during the 1960s and early 1970s, and continue to interest the mineral industry as new transportation alternatives become available. The Ungava Peninsula has been explored for nickel and platinum since the late 1950s. Gold exploration has been continuous since the early 1970s when the price of gold was allowed to float. Exploration efforts peaked in the 1986 to 1988 period when many companies were financing their northern operations through the use of ‘flow through’ funds, monies generated through a generous tax rebate incentive program established by the federal government. Base metal exploration has taken place in the Arctic Islands, in the greenstone belts north of Yellowknife and southwest of Rankin Inlet, in Nunavik and in Labrador - resulting in the discovery of the massive deposit at Voisey’s Bay. And during the 1990s the search for diamonds has resulted in the staking of vast tracts of land on the mainland of the NWT as well as in the Arctic islands.

Since 1950, six mines have operated north of the tree line in the NWT:

* the NORTH RANKIN NICKEL MINE (1957-1962) became the first modern underground mine north of the tree line when it opened 1957. The property had been discovered 30 years previously, but it took the Korean War to raise the price of nickel to a level where it could be mined profitably. The operation of the mine is the subject of several classic studies by Robert Williamson. The mine closed in 1962, after only five years in operation, and no consideration was given to the long-term impacts on the Inuit workers, the new settlement of Rankin Inlet, or the environment. Williamson’s studies tell a story almost unknown to most Canadians: how, despite some problems of adaptation to both industrial work discipline and settlement life, many Keewatin Inuit men moved right ‘off the land’ into an underground mine. Just before the mine closed, Inuit made up between 60 and 70 per cent of the total work force. "Indeed they were found in every operation of the mine except the drawing office, the assay lab, and the accounting office," Williamson noted. "Heavy equipment operating and indeed almost all of the surface work was done by Eskimos, the chief plumber and pipe fitter were Eskimo, and usually lone white men supervised Eskimo crews in the areas of mechanics and repair, electrical work, the power house and the boiler house... In all of these realms of employment the nickel mine ... continued its policy of rotation whereby there were always more men trained in any specific skill in the local labour pool than there were jobs available. The personality and policies of [a resident employment consultant] were vital in the whole story of this operation. Nothing was held against an Eskimo employee who wished to step out of his regular job for a time to return to hunting or indeed to return to his home settlement." When the mine closed there was no replacement employment available locally, and some Inuit workers were so intent on continuing to work in mining that they traveled as far afield as Asbestos Hill, Thompson and Yellowknife in order to do so. The tailings were abandoned in a thoughtless manner, and the federal government has recently covered them - at significant expense.
  • the small HOPE BAY (1973-1975) silver mine, located 150 km southwest of Cambridge Bay, shipped 3,400 kg of silver from a deposit which was only mined during the summer months.
  • the NANISIVIK (1976-present) lead and zinc body was discovered in 1910, but didn’t receive serious attention until the late 1950s. In 1974 Mineral Resources International Ltd. negotiated - with considerable support from the federal government - financing which allowed the mine to come into production two years later. One of the conditions established by the federal government for its $16.3 million contribution toward the mine’s infrastructure was a commitment to employ Inuit. Zinc and lead concentrates are stockpiled throughout the year, then shipped to Europe for processing each summer. The life of the mine has been extended several times as a result of on-going exploration, however no new ore bodies have been found in recent years and the mine’s end is at hand. Nanisivik is unique in both having an adjacent townsite and in being connected by a 30 km road to the Inuit community of Arctic Bay. Proximity to the mine has been overwhelmingly positive for the people of Arctic Bay; the community has benefited from employment, improved medical care, dock facilities and air transportation, with few negative social impacts.
  • the POLARIS (1981-present) lead and zinc mine in the High Arctic resulted from more than a decade of geological work, and - unlike Nanisivik - was constructed without government investment. The mill and offices were built in southern Canada and transported to the site on a barge, which was then submersed on a prepared foundation. The mill is designed to be portable so that after the mine is closed - in a few years time - the mill can be moved to a new site. A fly-in/fly-out operation, Polaris’ zinc and lead concentrates are shipped to European smelters each summer aboard the M.V. Arctic, a specially designed, ice-strengthened Canadian ship.
  • the small CULLATON LAKE (1981-1985) gold mine in the Keewatin region was shut down when the price of gold declined to the point that operations were no longer economic.
  • the LUPIN (1982-present) gold property on the shores of Contwoyto Lake was purchased by Echo Bay Mines in 1980 and brought into production two years later. The mine was designed to be built, supplied and resupplied by air, and most of the freight required during the development of the mine was shipped to the site by large aircraft from Yellowknife. Now the bulk of freight is trucked from Yellowknife to the site on a winter road open from late January to early April of each year. Lupin is now the most productive gold mine in the NWT, having surpassed - and with lower production costs - the older mines located around Yellowknife. Echo Bay employs roughly 50 Inuit employees from the Kitikmeot region, flying workers to and from the communities of Kugluktuk (formerly Coppermine) and Cambridge Bay every two weeks. The Lupin ore body is approaching the end of its economic life, however Echo Bay is hoping to develop satellite ore bodies to keep the Lupin mill in production. Echo Bay has purchased the Ulu gold deposit, located 155 km north of the existing mine, and plans to truck the ore to the minesite on a winter road. The Inuit Impact Benefits Agreement (IIBA) for the Ulu project is discussed later in this paper.
One mine has operated north of the tree line in Nunavik,

* the ASBESTOS HILL (1972-1983) mine, located 30 km south of Deception Bay, Ungava, was one of the first unionized industrial sites in the Canadian Arctic and also the first fly-in/fly-out mine (with a rotational employment scheme of 90 days in followed by 14 days out). The product was shipped by road to a port at Deception Bay and, during an 80-day period each summer, the entire year’s production was shipped to Germany for processing.

A number of iron mines have operated in the Labrador City-Schefferville corridor, and a quarry has recently been developed near Nain, Labrador by a subsidiary of the Labrador Inuit Development Corporation. Small quantities of large blocks of anorthosite and labradorite have been shipped to Italy for processing; the stone fetches a premium price under the trade name ‘Reflect Blue’.

Last, but certainly not least, are the two important projects currently under construction in Labrador and Nunavik: the massive Voisey’s Bay nickel, copper and cobalt project just south of Nain, Labrador, and the Raglan nickel mine in Nunavik.

The Role of Mining in the Economy of the Northwest Territories
Since the 1920s, the history and development of the western NWT has been closely tied to - and its wage economy has largely been driven by - its mineral industry. Much of the infrastructure of the western NWT exists as a result of mineral exploration and production activity.

While current production is limited to gold, zinc and lead, the Australian mining giant BHP is expected to start production at North America’s first diamond mine within a year.(2)

The mineral sector is a key wealth-generating and job-creating sector of the NWT economy. Mineral exploration provides jobs and business opportunities to communities large and small. Once in production, mines produce export goods and create direct jobs as well as jobs in the service and small business sectors. The potential of the mineral sector is almost unlimited, as the geological potential of the NWT is virtually untouched.

Exploration
The mineral industry is composed of two distinct sectors. Mineral exploration consists of prospecting, exploration, and the development of a mineral property or deposit, including all associated services. Exploration activities are small scale and, as a result of regulation, environmentally fairly benign. Calculating the economic impact of exploration activity is difficult, but we know that it creates significant numbers of direct (albeit seasonal) jobs and is a critical factor in the success of many service and retail businesses (e.g. air charter, trucking, accommodations, food, and misc. supplies).

With total exploration expenditures believed to have topped $200 million in 1996, the NWT likely attracted the largest share of mineral exploration expenditures of any jurisdiction in Canada for the third consecutive year. The prime impetus was the discovery of diamonds in 1991, which triggered one of the most intense searches for kimberlites the world has ever seen, but the frantic claim- staking activity also uncovered other potentially economically viable deposits of precious and base metals.

The scale and pace of future mining development will be determined by the size and grade of ore deposits, the world price of minerals, and the cost of extracting and transporting them to market. Prospects for the development of new gold mines - and the chances for survival of the existing mines - depend on the notoriously volatile (and currently very low) world price of gold. Base metal prices are also prone to price fluctuations, but development of base metal mines confronts yet another hurdle common in the north - lack of infrastructure. Gold bricks can be profitably flown to market, but lead, zinc and copper, etc. must be shipped in bulk, and that requires access to suitable roads and/or ice-free waters.

So, for example, while Metall Mining Corporation’s Izok Lake zinc-copper-lead-silver deposit, located about 270 km south of Kugluktuk (formerly Coppermine), is the largest undeveloped lead- zinc deposit in North America, it will remain untapped until there is a road connecting the minesite to a deep-sea port on the Coronation Gulf. Similarly, other known deposits will require the construction of infrastructure to render development economic. At the moment it would not be commercially feasible to develop the needed infrastructure without the financial assistance of government, and it is not likely to put up the capital any time soon (as it could and did for Nanisivik in the late 1970s). However, there is a distinct possibility that a few more mineral discoveries in the area would render a road and port commercially viable.

Since 1994 expenditures on advanced exploration have exceeded those on basic exploration - which have fallen to pre-diamond levels. This raises concerns that if basic exploration does not find additional prospects worth developing then advanced exploration expenditures will not continue at anything like their current level.

Mineral exploration has become a very competitive global industry, and the NWT competes for exploration dollars with countries around the world. The specific location of future growth in exploration and development will, of course, be significantly influenced by the industry’s perception of relative risk and rewards.

Operating Mines
The NWT currently exports close to $600 million annually from seven operating mines - four major gold mines, one small-scale gold mine, and two base metal mines.(3) in 1995 NWT mines produced 13,758 kg of gold (roughly 9% of Canada’s total), 178,965 tonnes of zinc (16% of Canada’s total), 31,542 tonnes of lead (16% of Canada’s total, and 18.0 tonnes of silver (1.5% of Canada’s total). Each of these production figures are a significant decrease from the production levels in 1990, but mining still accounts for almost 36% of the NWT’s Gross Domestic Product.

In 1990 the average annual income in mining in the NWT was $68,600 - almost twice the $35,000 average income for all jobs in the NWT at that time.

Of the approximately 1,500 employees of mines in the NWT in 1994, roughly 10% were aboriginal and roughly 60% were "northerners" (aboriginal and/or residents of the NWT):(4)
Mine Total
Employees		 Northern
Employees		 Percentage
Northern		 Aboriginal
Employees		 Percentage
Aboriginal
Nanisivik 205 125 60,9% 40 19,5%
Polaris 275 95 34,5% 27 9,8%
Lupin 385 53 13,8% 53 13,8%
Giant 220 220 100% 12 5,4%
Con 348 348 100% 15 to 20 4,3-5,8%
Treminco 15 15 100% 0 0,0%
Totals 1.448 856 59,1% 147 to 152 10,2-10,5%
It is worth noting that the three mines located in Nunavut (the first three in the chart - Nanisivik, Polaris and Lupin) have a significantly higher level of aboriginal employment than the three mines located in the western NWT. The two fly-in/fly-out mines (Polaris and Lupin) have a lower level of employees who are northern residents (aboriginal and non-aboriginal) than Nanisivik (which has an adjacent townsite) or the three mines located in or around the city of Yellowknife.

In addition to this direct employment it is estimated that the mines generate roughly 2,000 indirect jobs, thus accounting for about 17% of the NWT’s total employment and 22% of its’ private sector employment.

The NWT’s share of total expenditures by mines operating in the NWT increased almost four-fold from 1981 (7%) to 1995 (26%, ignoring smelting/refining charges) when $35 million was spent in the north. Wages (benefits excluded) to mine personnel at the six major operations totaled $105 million in 1994. Mines on all-weather road systems made 60% of their purchases in the NWT; Lupin, on a winter ice road, made about 11% of its purchases in the NWT; while Nanisivik and Polaris, whose isolated locations require marine transportation services during the short summer of Canada’s High Arctic, made less than 1% of their purchases in the NWT. There is a clearly a determining relationship between the existence of inexpensive, year-round transportation to and from a minesite and the level of northern expenditures by the company which operates it.

Many of the issues that the mineral industry in the NWT face remain under the jurisdiction of the federal government. For example, the regulations under which the mineral industry operates in the NWT are set and controlled by the federal government - including the royalties for mining production in the NWT. These royalties, which are also collected by the federal government, are profit-based - and therefore sensitive to operating costs and metal prices. The Government of the Northwest Territories (GNWT) continues to work with the federal government, representing the northern mineral industry to ensure that the federal government recognizes and addresses the issues and concerns that affect the territorial economy.

The Role of Mining in the Future Economy of Nunavut
When Inuit negotiated and implemented land claims settlements, it was with the objective of promoting Inuit self-reliance, to protect our environment and traditional lifestyle and to provide us with means to participate in the national and northern economy. The specific measures within these claims including land ownership, financial compensation, environmental assessment and review mechanisms, wildlife management bodies and other Inuit rights and benefits were designed to assist in the achievement of these objectives.

We have also sought to use the lands, fiscal resources, and management powers we have obtained in our claims settlements (and which we still seek in Labrador) to generate wealth and security for our people.(5)

The creation of Nunavut is almost upon us, and many people’s thoughts are turning to the economic future of the new territory. One component of that future economy will be the commercial development of the territory’s abundant renewable resources. Another component of that future economy will hopefully be the development of the territory’s equally abundant non- renewable resources.

Unless significant new ore bodies are discovered in the near future, Nunavut’s three operating mines (Nanisivik, Polaris and Lupin) may all be closed within a few years of the territory’s creation - yet mining is widely hoped to become the salvation of what is, by southern standards, a very weak wage economy. And this salvation may yet come to pass - several mining projects are entering the permitting process established by the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement (NLCA), Inuit-owned corporations are negotiating both contracts and joint venture partnerships with mining companies, and the investment climate is realistically upbeat.

The settlement of the NLCA has resulted in the establishment of a set of powerful co-management bodies - the Nunavut Impact Review Board (NIRB), the Nunavut Planning Commission (NPC), the Nunavut Water Board (NWB), and the Nunavut Wildlife Management Board (NWMB) - and will soon result in the creation of a public Nunavut Government. These developments should go a long way towards reducing the mineral industry’s concerns about regulatory uncertainty and political instability - especially once a successful new mine proves that the implementation of Nunavut has not resulted in the creation of an impossibly complex regulatory environment.

The Inuit political leadership is energetically spreading the message that it welcomes investment and environmentally responsible mining development in Nunavut. Legal stability, a sound banking system, an eager service sector and good education and health systems for workers and their families also contribute to a positive investment climate.

There can be no denying that commercial uses of renewable resources, arts and crafts, and tourism are important sources of employment and income in Nunavut, and that there is considerable room for expansion in each of these sectors. Likewise, the domestic country food harvest is a significant source of food and clothing that would otherwise have to be imported - as well as a critical component of Inuit culture. Nonetheless, in terms of their capacity to provide business opportunities create job opportunities for the ever-growing number of unemployed they pale in comparison with the non-renewable sector.

That being the case, the Nunavut Government will likely place a priority on geological mapping - arguably the single most cost-effective incentive that government can provide to encourage mineral industry activity. Most of the north has been geologically mapped only at compilation or regional scale. Much of this work was done more than 25 years ago and lacks the advantages of modern technology and concepts. It is estimated that only 4% of the land area of the NWT has been mapped at a scale required by the exploration industry. The economic risk that companies take is increased substantially by this lack of basic geological data, and as a result large areas of Nunavut have received only cursory grassroots prospecting. The almost complete lack of infrastructure further increases the cost of mineral exploration in Nunavut.

Considering Nunavut’s vast mineral potential, however, the possibility of finding another diamond prospect or another Voisey’s Bay seems excellent so long as substantial exploration momentum can be maintained. Any potential development, however, will face substantial costs for infrastructure development and/or transportation costs. For mineral deposits in Nunavut to be considered economically viable, they will likely be either richer (i.e. higher grade) than deposits that are considered economic elsewhere, larger than deposits that are considered economic elsewhere, and/or located close to a good site for a deep water port. The standards of environmental protection, Inuit economic benefits and human resource development required by the NLCA must also be understood as entailing additional costs which might not be incurred in other countries.

Issue: Environmental Protection
More than two decades of Canadian Inuit experience with the environmental impacts of non-renewable resource development were distilled into the ‘Protecting Lands and Resources’ section (pp. 75-6) of the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada (ITC)’s submission to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples(RCAP):

No issue is more important to Inuit than ensuring that the Arctic environment and its renewable resources are preserved and managed for present and future generations. Every community and region is blessed with a large (and for the most part still unimpaired and unalienated) land and water base, from which our hunters can sustain us. In numerous national and international fora, Inuit have emphasized our support for sustainable and equitable economic development provided that biological productivity is not disrupted, and traditional harvesting activities are protected. Our land claims agreements are based upon this fundamental objective, as are the activities of ITC, ICC, and other Inuit representative organizations.

For over twenty years, Inuit have called for comprehensive and effective environmental and social impact assessment of major developments in the North. Since the inception of federal, provincial, and territorial impact assessment processes, Inuit have sought full participation, and demanded the highest standards in both assessment techniques and the public review processes themselves. Inuit continue to be committed to impact assessment as a planning and review procedure on both public and Inuit lands, and our final agreements provide for these. We want to ensure not only that these procedures are democratic and effective, but also that they result, where appropriate, in design modification and mitigation of adverse effects.

Protecting lands and resources was one of the principle objectives of negotiating claims settlements. Through these, Inuit have secured a substantial land base in fee simple title, exclusive or priority access rights to certain renewable resources, and management authority over all lands and waters in the Inuit homeland (these are pending in Labrador, subject to the outcome of negotiations).

In signing land claim settlements, Canada is constitutionally obligated to upholding aboriginal rights as entrenched in the agreements, and implementing the institutional measures that the agreements provide for. Both these rights and the institutional framework are subject to constitutional protection. Further, Canada should adhere to the spirit of the agreements while implementation proceeds, and in respect to interim protection measures, while negotiations proceed.

Recommendation # 35
Federal and provincial environmental and social impact assessment procedures should be modified, where necessary, to reflect the needs and values of Inuit and other aboriginal peoples. Specifically:
  1. assessment should take place on a cumulative, bio-region (or impact area) wide basis, and not on artificial jurisdictional boundaries;
  2. assessment panels should be given broad mandates to consider social and cumulative effects;
  3. where a project is approved, effective provisions for monitoring and post-audit are to be put in place;
  4. the health concerns of aboriginal people must be respected;
  5. the standing of representative Inuit organizations before the panels should be ensured and respected
Inuit have made significant contributions to the development of impact assessment practices in Canada, especially in the areas outlined in the above ITC recommendation to the RCAP. It is therefore fitting that the ‘cutting edge’ of impact assessment in Canada is the review of the proposed Voisey’s Bay mine and mill in northern Labrador. A copy of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) Guidelines for that review is appended to this report.

As the Labrador Inuit land claim has not yet been settled, and therefore no other impact assessment process has been established in the region, the Voisey’s Bay review is taking place under federal environmental assessment legislation. A review panel, which includes a prominent Labrador Inuit elder and a former Director of Research for the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, was appointed by the federal government. The panel’s Terms of Reference were contained in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreed upon by the federal government, the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, and the two regional aboriginal representative organizations - the Labrador Inuit Association (LIA) and the Innu Nation of Labrador.

The panel’s first task was to establish guidelines for the proponent’s Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). It is important to note the opportunities presented to the "public" - which includes representative aboriginal organizations, governments of communities close to the proposed project, and the public at large - to contribute to both the development of the EIS guidelines and the subsequent review process:
When preparing the draft guidelines, the Panel reviewed the scoping reports prepared by the Innu Nation ("Between a Rock and a Hard Place") and the LIA (‘Seeing the Land is Seeing Ourselves’), dated 15 March, 1996, and 4 July, 1996, respectively, as instructed by the MOU. The draft guidelines were available in four languages for public review and comment beginning on March 14, 1997. The Panel then held public meetings (scoping sessions) in communities in Labrador and in St. John’s, during April and May of 1997 to hear comments and suggestions from the public and the signatories to the MOU.
Following the scoping sessions and after careful consideration of all comments received, the Panel has prepared these final Guidelines. Although the main purpose of the scoping phase was to produce the final Guidelines, the Panel believes all oral and written submissions made in the scoping phase to be important contributions to the review process. The Panel, therefore, encourages the Proponent to consider all information received during the scoping phase when preparing the EIS.
The Guidelines establish the issues that the Proponent must address in the EIS, how to describe and assess these issues, and how to structure the EIS. While the Guidelines provide a framework for preparing a complete and accessible EIS, it is the responsibility of the Proponent to provide sufficient data and analysis to allow evaluation of the environmental effects of the Undertaking by the Panel, the public, and technical and regulatory agencies. The Proponent will prepare an EIS to address the requirements of the Guidelines for submission to the Panel.
The Panel will then make the EIS available to the public and will receive comments, during a 75 day review period, on the adequacy of the EIS as a response to the Guidelines. The Panel will consider oral comments as fully as written comments. Within 30 days of the close of this review period, the Panel will determine if the EIS contains adequate information to hold public hearings. If the information provided in the EIS is determined not to be sufficient, the Panel will request additional information. The Panel will only proceed to public hearings when it has determined that the EIS contains adequate information to allow effective public review of the Undertaking.
For an impact assessment process to make both the greatest possible contribution towards sustainable development and have the greatest degree of legitimacy in the eyes of those whose lives may impacted by a project, a review must be - AND MUST BE SEEN TO BE - rigorous, comprehensive, and fair.

When this is not the case - or when it is perceived not to have been the case - the results can be, to say the least, unpleasant and unsettling. A good example of one such outcome is documented in the article "Diamond mining and the demise of environmental assessment in the north" by Kevin O’Reilly, Research Director of the Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, in Northern Perspectives 24:1-4, 1996 (appended to this report).

A major factor in the controversy over the adequacy of the impact assessment of the BHP diamond proposal was the role of federal government departments. Downsizing had left some of them with only limited resources to contribute to the review process, and critics of this review were careful not to personally blame the few public servants left to defend the public interest in the BHP impact assessment and in similar matters.

Even the Voisey’s Bay impact assessment is not without its controversies, as demonstrated by the article "Court blocks Inco work at Voisey’s Bay: Concerned that ‘justice delayed is justice denied’, Newfoundland judges side with Inuit and issue an injunction" in the August 27, 1997 Toronto Globe and Mail (appended to this report). The question of whether a ‘comprehensive’ impact assessment can exclude even a ‘temporary’ airstrip and road is a political issue, and not something that the panel itself can decide upon.

But there is little doubt that the Voisey’s Bay project will proceed, and in a reasonably timely manner. The role of the panel will therefore be to ensure that the proponent prepares an EIS of the highest quality, that the public is fully informed of both the process and the proposal, that the public has ample opportunity to review and comment on the EIS, that regulations are put in place to ensure safe operation of the mine and mill, and that appropriate monitoring regimes are put in place.

The role of other impact assessment panels has been quite different. For example, in 1988, Urangesellschaft Canada Ltd. sought approval for development of the Kiggavik uranium deposit some 75 km west of the community of Baker Lake. The federal government (with the support of the GNWT) referred the project to a federal environmental assessment panel. The people of Baker Lake (and the Keewatin region generally) made significant contributions to the development of the EIS guidelines, which the proponent acknowledged were quite reasonable. Expert review of the EIS revealed that the proponent was simply not up to the task of designing and managing such a project. The GNWT submission to the panel concluded that the EIS was "either missing or incomplete in areas such as socio-economic structure, camp arrangements, renewable resource use, worker health and safety, public health, effects of change caused by the mine, risk management, tailings management, site decommissioning, monitoring and post-project analysis". The panel agreed with these and other critiques of the EIS, and the proponent was told that it had failed to prepare an acceptable document. Faced with having to both rewrite its EIS and attempt to overcome deep opposition in Baker Lake, Urangesellschaft chose to request an indefinite delay of the review process. In effect, they shelved the proposal for the forseeable future.

While the outcome of some impact assessment s may anger communities and environmentalists dissatisfied with the impact assessment process, the few cases in which impact assessments reject a proposal or result in it being abandoned or mothballed infuriate some cheerleaders for the mining industry. In the case of the Kiggavik impact assessment, for example, a former Member of Parliament from the western NWT was driven to attempt to rewrite history:
The Kiggavik uranium mine venture at Baker Lake was shot down by an environmental assessment review panel that just could not do its job and come to a decision. As an excuse for its own ineptitude, it kept demanding more reams of information so that, eventually, the sponsoring company got fed up with spending time and money with no end in sight. It pulled the pin and a project which could have revitalised the economy of the entire Keewatin was cast into a dungeon from which it might never recover... a window of opportunity was opened and then inexorably closed as government dithered, procrastinated and finally missed the boat altogether.
Only time - and another impact assessment - will reveal how much of the community’s spirited resistance to the Kiggavik proposal is to the very concept of having a uranium mine nearby, and how much was to having this specific proposal, by this specific proponent, under an impact assessment process which many people found inadequate, before the NLCA was settled. I suspect that the last two points were of critical importance to many of the Inuit residents of Baker Lake.

Issue: Employment and Human Resource Development
A wide spectrum of direct and indirect jobs are associated with the mineral industry. The level of training ranges from none or minimal for general labourers, to apprenticeships and trades certificates, to advanced university degrees. The skills of many occupations are required in mining operations. In addition to miners, heavy equipment operators, technicians, variable disciplines of engineers, welders, clerks, and cooks are needed. Mineral exploration activity also requires a similarly diverse range of personnel - often seasonal jobs which can be tied in with traditional activities. Mining and mineral exploration activity also requires the services of other sectors, producing additional spin-off jobs. Transportation services such as helicopter and air charter companies benefit, as do construction firms, expediting companies and catering businesses.

The percentage of aboriginal employment in mines in the NWT has historically ranged between 9% and 12%. Surveys of mine employers and employees suggest that a major barrier to increased northern employment has been the lack of specialized skills appropriate to the industry, the lack of experience, and a lack of desire to work in a mine. The latter point is understandable; it is no more reasonable to assume that everyone should want to work in a mine than it would be to assume that everyone should want to work for government.

Perhaps the most successful example of Inuit employment in the mining industry to date is that of the Lupin gold mine, located 350 km south of Kugluktuk and 400 km northeast of Yellowknife. The mine opened in 1982 as a fly-in/fly-out operation with the workforce drawn largely from Yellowknife and southern Canada, but partially from the Inuit communities of Kugluktuk and Cambridge Bay. It was developed, and continues to operate, without financial support from government.

Before the mine opened in 1981 the owners, Echo Bay Mines Ltd., entered into a socio-economic agreement with the GNWT to provide employment and training for aboriginal people. A second agreement was negotiated in 1984, but was never implemented. It was considered unnecessary as the number of Inuit employed at the mine grew from approximately 7% when production began to 13% of the present workforce. In 1992 between 30 and 36 workers came from Kugluktuk and 8 from Cambridge Bay.

Several reasons account for Lupin’s success in recruiting and retaining Inuit employees. Echo Bay had a policy and a commitment to hire Inuit workers, and to a proactive approach to accomplish their goal. Company managers were experienced northern mine operators, with some understanding of and respect for Inuit lifestyles. Kugluktuk was the nearest community to the minesite, and many Inuit from that community had previous industrial work experience gained from the oil and gas exploration that took place in the 1970s and early 1980s. Echo Bay followed the example of the oil companies, and hired Inuit employment co-ordinators in both communities. The company also initiated direct discussions with the Hamlet Councils (the municipal governments), community hunters and trappers associations, and regional Inuit organizations which led to increased mutual understanding and fostered a spirit of co-operation.

Originally the work rotational schedule was 28 days in and 14 days out, but in 1986 workers voted to change the rotation to 14 days in and 14 days out. It is thought that the shorter rotation allows better opportunities for hunting and other activities on the land and/or with families, and thereby contributes to a low turnover rate. In 1987 the company reported that Lupin had a 10 to 12% turnover rate overall, and only 1 to 2% for entry-level jobs. The worker with the most seniority at the mine was an Inuk from Kugluktuk.

As well as the economic benefits to individual workers and their families, the community of Kugluktuk as a whole has benefited from the Echo Bay operation. Approximately $1 million from the wages earned by workers is injected into the local economy each year, and Kugluktuk has one of the lowest rates of dependency on social assistance of any Nunavut community. And because the workforce is stable, this income is a dependable component of the economy - albeit one dependent on the continued operation of the mine.

Another example of a mine with high levels of aboriginal employment is Cogema Resources’ Cluff Lake uranium mine in northern Saskatchewan. A recent review of factors contributing to its success cited a ‘progression system’,

which allows workers to move from entry level positions to the top of the wage scale through the combination of on-the-job training and experience, provides incentives for employees to stay on the job. Gone are the days of ‘pick and shovel jobs’ where a labourer remained as such with no opportunity of advancement. In the majority of the job categories at the minesite, workers can move from the entry level position to the top level in a period of less than five years. Such advancement would include wage increases in the order of $20,000 over this period (that is, from $30,000 entry level to $50,000 top rate).(6)

In summary, the experience of mines in the Canadian Arctic reveals the following:
  • companies that have entered into socio-economic agreements are most likely to have a higher aboriginal participation rate. They tend to develop better policies in this regard, and tend to implement them with more enthusiasm than might otherwise be the case. LESSON: raising the level of aboriginal employment in a mine is not rocket science; it simply requires the right attitude on the part of the company, policies which seek to implement the company’s goals, managers committed to implementing those policies, and aboriginal people willing to give it a try.
  • aboriginal communities and individuals consistently state the need for better communications by the mining companies. LESSON: building a partnership with selected communities begins with establishing clear and open lines of communication.
  • it is likely that remote mines, those with fly-in/fly-out rotational employment schemes, will achieve higher levels of aboriginal participation in their workforce that those that are located near or in existing communities. LESSON: rotational employment schemes allow for traditional pursuits like hunting to be maintained, something that is more difficult with the ‘40 hour week’ schedule of a townsite mine.
  • many aboriginal people acknowledge a lack of desire to work at a minesite, but go on to express a desire to work in businesses which service the mining operation. LESSON: as many jobs are created or supported BY mining as IN mining. The skills required to work in the various supply, support and expediting ventures connected with mineral exploration, for example, are not specific to the mining industry and can be marketable in other sectors of the economy (notably the tourism sector).


Issue: Other Socio-Economic Benefits
WHEREAS mining development in Nunavut is intended to lead to value added to the regional economy through the provision of economic benefits to Inuit during all stages of mining including underground exploration, development, operation and abandonment;
WHEREAS the Kitikmeot Inuit must receive benefits and opportunities arising from development of the Ulu Project on Inuit Owned Lands; ...
WHEREAS the KIA wishes to protect and promote the existing and future well-being of the residents and communities of the Nunavut Settlement Area through the protection of the ecosystemic integrity of the Nunavut Settlement Area;
WHEREAS Echo Bay wishes to operate in a manner to minimise impacts on the environment and on wildlife;
WHEREAS the parties recognize that protection of the environment should be balanced with the benefits to be obtained through economic development; ...
WHEREAS activities related to development of the Ulu Project can assist in providing opportunities for expanding and/or enhancing the regional business community and employment of Inuit, and can add value to the Kitikmeot regional economy; ...
WHEREAS training and education are a shared responsibility of Echo Bay as employer, the KIA as facilitator of opportunities that benefit the Inuit, the individual who desires to improve his skills and the governments at the territorial and federal levels; ...
WHEREAS Echo Bay and the KIA agree that it is desireable to reach a level of Inuit employment equal to sixty percent (60%) of the total man-hours then being worked on the Ulu Project by all personnel, whether employed directly by Echo Bay, or by its contractors and subcontractors; ...
The future of the relationship between mining companies and Inuit in Nunavut can be read in the above portions of the preambles to articles of an Inuit Impact Benefit Agreement (IIBA) for the proposed Ulu gold project. In September 1996 Echo Bay Mines (cited previously for their successful Lupin gold mine) agreed to a long list of goals - and plans to implement those goals - with their new partners in development, the Kitikmeot Inuit Association (KIA). This agreement represents a level of respect from - and partnership with - industry which would be almost unbelievable to most aboriginal communities on the planet.

Under this legally binding contract (which is appended to this report):
  • an Implementation Panel composed of 3 KIA representatives and 2 company representatives will monitor the implementation of the IIBA and assist in resolution of any disputes between the two parties;
  • the two parties agree to provide each other with advance copies of project-related press releases for comment prior to their public release;
  • where practicable, the company will break down all multi-component contracts into discrete tendering packages which can be bid as a group or individually;
  • the company shall evaluate all proposals, tenders, or direct negotiationson the basis of the "Inuit content" as outlined in Schedule ‘D’ of theagreement;
  • the company shall give the KIA’s development corporation the first right to negotiate contracts expected to exceed $500,000 in value;
  • on contracts expected to total between $50,000 and $500,000 in value the company shall give between 60 and 90 days notice, to provide Inuit owned business the opportunity to bid on the contracts;
  • the company shall prepare an analysis of all jobs required for the development and operation of the project, a training program (inco-operation with the KIA and the regulatory agencies), trades apprenticeship programs, and a labour force development plan related to the requirements of the project;
  • within two years, the company shall reach a level of Inuit employment of sixty percent (60%) of the project man-hours worked annually by its personnel;
  • the company will provide free travel for workers from designated communities to and from the minesite, likely on a combination of ‘two week in, one week out’ and ‘four weeks in, two weeks out’ rotation schedules, and will subsidize the travel for workers from non-designated communities;
  • the company will make efforts to hire unilingual Inuktitut speakers, and totranslate signs, safety regulations and job advertisements into Inuinaqtun (‘Roman orthography’) and Inuktitut (‘syllabics’); and,
  • a number of other commitments are made by both parties.
Article 26 of the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement states that would-be developers MUST negotiate IIBAs with designated Inuit organizations beforethey can start to develop a project. An IIBA is not something that acompany can choose to enter into if it feels like doing so; it is an absolute necessity for developing a project in Nunavut, and the requirement to do so is entrenched in a constitutionally-protected land claim.(7)

In effect, IIBAs are a type of mandatory socio-economic agreement, an instrument employed with increasing frequency to ensure that proposed projects provide maximum benefits and protection to the local population. A recent socio-economic agreement between the GNWT and BHP Diamonds is appended to this report.

Issue: Socio-Economic Impacts
Nunavut’s youngest residents face a very uncertain future if a sustainable economic base cannot be found to provide them with jobs when they become adults. And just as the communities have had to accept that no economic activity is without an environmental impact, they have also come to accept that no economic activity is without a socio-economic impact. The difference between the two is that an environment without an economic change agent will stay the same, while a rapidly growing community without an economic change agent may very well deterioriate.

While on some levels the nature of the concerns expressed about the possible negative socio- economic impacts of development has remained constant over the past 20 years, the economic, social and political contexts in which those concerns are expressed have evolved dramatically. The communities are growing and changing at rates that would have been thought impossible only a decade ago, and the settlement of the NLCA and the establishment of the Nunavut Government seem likely to greatly increase the rate of change at the same time as they empower communities to manage and cope with change.

The leadership in the communities is growing more confident in its ability to manage development, and less willing to be ‘protected’ from change.

The Inuit of Nunavut have successfully negotiated a land claim perhaps without parallel in the world - an agreement which would be impossible to obtain in Canada today. The next challenge is to use that land claim to achieve sustainable development.

While harvesting activities continue to provide an important source of food for Inuit, provide a significant offset to the cost of importing food from the south, and play a critical role in Inuit culture, harvesting viewed in purely economic terms is a sector with relatively few cash inputs or outputs. Hunters do not receive much in the way of cash for the meat and fish they provide - ‘animal rights’ activists have made sure of that - and since hunting for food is not an income- producing activity ‘cash inputs’ from other sources are necessary to support harvest activities.

In most communities cash income has come from three sources: income from renewable resource activities (trapping, fishing, arts & crafts), transfer payments, and local wage employment. The collapse of the market for seal skins dealt many Canadian Inuit communities a heavy blow, and in recent years the market for Inuit arts & crafts has been stagnant at best. While wage employment in the communities has increased over the past decade, extremely rapid population growth and low (but rising) educational level shave resulted in high and rising unemployment. As a result, transfer payments have increased at a dizzying rate.

New employment opportunities in the communities appear to be rather limited. One of the few bright spots on the horizon would appear to be the jobs resulting from the implementation of the NLCA and the establishment of the Nunavut Government, but given the politics of public finance in Canadathe northern public sector can only be expected to fill a small portion of the need. In short, the demand for new jobs in Nunavut will be extreme.

People skeptical of the mining industry often note there is really no such thing as a ‘permanent’ mine, so that any business, employment and training opportunities which operating mines offer are by definition ‘temporary.’ An economy which relies heavily on unstable non-renewable resource development is subject to wild cycles that can be temporal or spatial: a prospective mine that looks economically attractive today may fall behind another prospect announced on the other side of the globe tomorrow, and an operating mine that is viable today may not be viable tomorrow if the world market price for its product(s) take a dive.

While this is true, it does not necessarily follow that mining development should therefore be viewed as unwelcome. The demographics and socio-economics of Nunavut argue that there is an urgent need for any and all environmentally sustainable economic activity which can generate business, employment and training opportunities. Community leaders understand that socio- economic change is one of the risks inherent in non-renewable resource development, however in Nunavut today the consensus is that economic growth is highly desireable so long as both the socio- economic and the environmental risks can be managed and minimized to an acceptable degree.

Many lessons have been learned - some of them painfully - about how to help maximize the benefits of mining to aboriginal communities and minimize the risks to the environment. Better methods of involving communities in the planning and review processes of industry and government can be developed, premised on partnership and co-operation rather than ‘power politics’ and confrontation. More - and more appropriate - education and training programs can be developed. New standards of environmental stewardship can be reached. And, most fundamentally, both government and industry can recognize and implement the inherent right of aboriginal communities to co-manage economic activities in their homelands.

The architects of the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement tried to incorporate all of these elements in the provisions of their land claim; only time and experience will tell if they succeeded.

Conclusions and Suggestions
Just over 20 years ago, at a very different time in Canadian Inuit political and socio-economic development, the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada issued a report which stated:

It appears that non-renewable resource development is a very poor solution for Inuit economic difficulties. It is recommended that this be regarded as but one minor alternative for a small proportion of the native population... massive programs attempting to draw Inuit into the energy and mineral extraction industries are unwise given the short-run nature of the developments and associated, negative, social impacts.(8)

Today the key goals of that early period of political activism on the part of Canadian Inuit have largely been achieved, and as the political leadership makes the transition from fighting underdevelopment to fighting underemployment the prevailing attitude towards mining and oil & gas development is changing significantly.

It is widely understood and accepted that mining is a rather speculative business, and that there is nothing that anyone in Nunavut - or anyone in Canada, for that matter - can do about the nature of the international commodity markets. Even the best planned and most enthusiastically supported mining ventures in the country will remain hostages to the whims of the global markets. It is also recognized that a project which is poorly conceived, poorly evaluated, poorly regulated and/or poorly managed - in any combination thereof - can cause massive and lasting environmental and social damage.

But given the mounting social problems and the perceived lack of economic options, a priority of the Canadian Inuit leadership today is to help create economically viable opportunities in the mineral sector, to make the most of those opportunities when they arise, and to minimize the environmental and social risks as far as possible. In the Nunavut Settlement Area, the tools believed capable of meeting those challenges include the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement, the powerful co- management bodies established as a result of it, and the Nunavut Government.

The piece of this large, complex puzzle which is - and which will likely continue to be - the most controversial and problematic is the assessment of possible environmental and socio-economic impacts. This is the process where the contradictions of the development process become apparent, where the public can have its say, and where differing perceptions of benefits and risk are sometimes sharply counterpoised to one another. This is also the process where poorly designed and managed projects can be scuttled, where well designed and managed projects can receive constructive criticism, and where plans to mitigate possible negative impacts can be explained, reviewed, and improved upon. Without such a process, individual communities or community residents can feel as oppressed by the threat of a potential development just as much as Inuit as a whole felt threatened by the massive development schemes of the 1970s and 1980s.

My highest priority for a research issue which may warrant investigation in advance of possible large-scale non-renewable resource development is, therefore, the question of "how can project proposals be evaluated in afair, comprehensive and rigorous manner?" How the public can best have input into the evaluation process? What competencies should the various levels and departments of government develop in order to be full and active participants in the evaluation process? What kinds of environmental and socio-economic baseline data are required to support a rigorous, comprehensive impact assessment?

And IF the field of research on gender issues in Greenlandic Inuit communities is as underdeveloped as it is with regard to Canadian Inuit communities, a second research issue which may warrant investigation is how mining and/or oil and gas development may impact on gender relations in the society as a whole.

Many other potentially fruitful research issues can be identified. How could the vocational and other education programs be changed or improved tomaximize young people’s chances of finding employment in the sectors of theeconomy discussed in this report? What kinds of mining and oil & gasrelated training can be offered which would have the greatest ‘portability’ to other sectors of the economy? How can older people, who have perhaps spent their working lives in an entirely different sector of the economy, be assisted to develop new skills and find new jobs? What kinds of stresses would large-scale mining and oil & gas development place on families and communities, and what can be done to strengthen the capacity of groups which assist in dealing with those stresses? How can small firms be assisted to benefit from business opportunities which may be much larger than anything that they have taken on previously? To what degree can large contracts be broken into smaller contracts more accessible to smaller firms? How does the possibility of low- cost sea transportation impact on the ability of Greenlandic businesses to supply mines and oil and gas developments? Would performance bonds be an incentive for proponents to comply with environmental regulations? What opportunities exist for business and/or technical collaboration with other Inuit? And, finally, how should a sudden increase in taxes and royalties be managed, and how and when should the state reinvest this income in the Greenlandic society? (Apleasant research topic, if ever there was one!)
(1). W.W. Nassichuk, "Forty years of northern non-renewable natural resource development", Arctic 40:4, 1987.

(2). The $750 million project is scheduled to begin mining five kimberlite pipes over 25 years beginning in 1999 at a rate of 9,000 tonnes a day, rising to 18,000 tonnes a day in the tenth year. The five initial pipes could ultimately be worth more than $14 billion and two other potentially economic pipes nearby could add another $3 billion; future exploration work may well reveal more. Annual revenues from the open pit operation are projected to range between $400 and $500 million per year for most of the duration of the project. The company expects to pay 1,000 workers (17% of whom are expected to be northern) a total of nearly $32 million during the two-year construction period, and then employ an average of 830 workers (two-thirds of whom are expected to be northern) during operation. According to BHP’s Environmental Impact Statement, coupled with the estimated 640 additional indirect and induced jobs this would boost northern payrolls by some $39 million annually and would raise average earned income by up to 40%. Further, it would reduce overall unemployment by about 3% (1.4% during construction), and by as much as 10% in some aboriginal communities. In addition, BHP will spend an average of approximately $57 million on goods and services to the year 2000. Total capital expenditures are projected at $1.2 billion, and BHP estimates the operation will increase Canada’s GDP by $6.2 billion over 25 years, with $2.5 million of this accruing to the NWT. Approximately 60% of this would be in the form of wages and benefits, and Canadian governments would collect roughly $2.5 billion in revenues.

(3). In addition to its minerals, the NWT exports around $200 million of oil annually. There are also vast undeveloped oil and gas reserves - estimated at 1.75 billion barrels of oil and 15 trillion cubic feet of natural gas.

(4). Reply by the Hon. John Todd, Minister of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources, to a question asked in the Legislative Assembly of the NWT on February 17, 1994 by MLA Ludy Pudluk.

(5). "Economic Development Through Claims Agreements", p. 68, Submission of the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada to the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, March 31, 1994.

(6). Cited in Increasing Knowledge: Eighth Annual Report on Aboriginal Participation in Mining, prepared by the Sub-Committee of the Intergovernmental Working Group on the Mineral Industry, July 1997. The Sub-Committee seeks "to document ‘best practices’ with a realistic view to the costs and benefits of each, and to identify new ways of matching aboriginal lifestyles with mineral industry employment opportunities; to identify practical steps which governments, mining companies, aboriginal groups and individuals can take to substantially boost aboriginal participation in mining; and, to examine what, if any, incentives could be identified, and what legal and structural barriers could be removed to speed progress toward the goal of increased aboriginal participation in mining".

(7). In addition, Article 25 of the NLCA stipulates that Inuit shall be paid an amount equal to one half of the first two million dollars of any resource royalties paid to government in a given year, and five per cent of any additional resource royalties paid in that year.

(8).Mann, Donald. The socio-economic impact of non-renewable ressource development on the Inuit of northern Canada. Ottawa: Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, 1975.
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